Talks

Forthcoming talks

Past talks

What's Really Wrong With Photograph­ic Transparen­cy

Where: British Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference 2009 When: September 2009

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Neuroimage­s as Photograph­s

Where: The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of East Anglia When: July 2009

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Photograph­ic Knowledge as Displaced Perception

Where: MindGrad 2008, University of Warwick When: December 2008

Respondent: Dr. Hemdat Lerman (Warwick)

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Photograph­ic Seeing: Transparen­t or Displaced?

Where: American Society for Aesthetics 2008 Annual Meeting, Northampton, MA. When: November 2008

Respondent: Prof. Patrick Maynard (Ontario)

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Can Photograph­ic Transparen­cy Explain Photograph­ic Realism?

Where: British Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference 2008 When: September 2008

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Photograph­ic Seeing: Transparen­t or Displaced?

Where: The 2008 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (Open Sessions), University of Aberdeen When: July 2008

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Sensorimot­or Enactivism Meets Pictorial Experience

Where: Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind Graduate Conference, University of Durham When: July 2008

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Sensorimot­or Enactivism Meets Pictorial Experience

Where: Open Minds 2008: Graduate Conference in Philosophy, University of Manchester When: June 2008

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Digital Technology and the Epistemic Value of Photograph­y

Where: British Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference 2007 When: September 2007

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Photograph­y and the Flow of Informatio­n

Where: The Turn to Aesthetics, Liverpool Hope University When: June 2007

Abstract of talk published in C. Palmer and D. Torevell, eds. The Turn to Aesthetics. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 280—281

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Digital Technology and the Epistemic Value of Photograph­y

Where: Aesthetics and Its History: 8th Annual Southampton Graduate Conference in Philosophy, University of Southampton When: April 2007

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Digital Technology and the Epistemic Value of Photograph­y

Where: Artist and Object Postgraduate Conference in Philosophy, University of Nottingham When: February 2007

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The Causal Exclusion Problem for Aesthetic Realism

Where: University of London Autumn 2006 Graduate Conference in Philosophy When: November 2006

Respondent: Hong Yu Wong (UCL)

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The Causal Exclusion Problem for Aesthetic Realism

Where: British Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference 2006 When: September 2006

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Talks attended by Dan Cavedon-Taylor

On Perceiving that Someone is Angry

Where: MindGrad 2008, Warwick Dates: 6th December 2008 - 7th December 2008

We know lots of things about each others’ mental states. There is a question about how we know such things. Historically, the answer was usually that we somehow infer what mental states others are in. The claim tended to be that we do this either by analogy, or as an inference to the best explanation of their behaviour.

An alternative claim is that we can know what mental states others are in by perceiving that they are in those mental states. Cassam, for example, defends the idea that ‘it’s possible to know that others think and feel by perceiving that others think and feel, and that it’s sometimes possible to know what others think and feel on the same basis’. Dretske claims that ‘the way I have of knowing that my wife is angry is the same way I have of knowing that her jaw is set and her eyes have that characteristic glint’. I can see that her jaw is set, see when her eyes have that characteristic glint. In the same way, Dretske argues, I can sometimes see that my wife is angry.

In this paper I first sketch Dretske and Cassam’s claims. I argue that in order to be interesting, the notion that we saw that another was angry would have to be both a determinate and distinctive answer to the question of how we knew that he was angry. I sketch reasons to think that neither’s view fulfills both criteria.

Finally, I put forward a way of understanding the claim that we sometimes perceive that others are in particular mental states which makes that claim distinctive. I will not defend this view. But I aim to allay some initial doubts about whether we could possibly perceive in this way.

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